



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  
**ENERGY**

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Office of Science

**CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP)  
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN**

**Public Version**

**Edited August 2013**

**May 2010**

# Approvals

This Office of Science Continuity of Operations Implementation Plan was prepared in accordance with the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-20/National Security Presidential Directive-51, *National Continuity Policy*, May 9, 2007; Department of Energy (DOE) Order 150.1, *Continuity Programs*, May 08, 2008; and the DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Continuity of Operations Plan, January 2010.

Submitted: Judith E. Blackistone Date: 05/14/10

Judith E. Blackistone  
Office of Science Continuity of  
Operations Coordinator

Approved: Marcus E. Jones Date: 5/14/10

Marcus E. Jones  
Associate Director of Science for  
Safety, Security and Infrastructure

## **NOTICE**

Portions of this Plan have been redacted for security and Privacy Act concerns.

Any request for further information regarding this Plan must be coordinated with the SC Continuity of Operations Coordinator.

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## **1 Introduction**

The Office of Science (SC) Continuity of Operations (COOP) Implementation Plan is required by DOE Order 150.1, *Continuity Programs*. This plan outlines the actions SC will take to perform its essential functions in the event of an emergency or situation that is a major disruption to normal SC Headquarters (HQ) operations. These emergencies include natural disasters; accidents; military, biological or terrorist attacks; pandemic incidents; and technological disruptions.

The SC COOP Implementation Plan explains the DOE/NNSA COOP notification and decision-making process and implementation of SC procedures, including notification of staff to ensure a sufficient response. This SC COOP Implementation Plan is applicable to all SC HQ elements, facilities, and personnel.

This SC COOP Implementation Plan enables the continuance of essential functions of SC for limited duration operation (30 days for 24 hour / 7 day operation or 60 days in a pandemic disease event) and enables SC to implement methods to safeguard personnel, records, and facilities, and ensures the capability to conduct functions at an office of convenience, Alternate Operating Facility (AOF), or devolution site until the resumption of normal operations.

## **2 COOP Responsibilities**

This section provides responsibilities for all SC HQ employees during COOP activation. A viable SC COOP Implementation Plan capability provides the means to implement the provisions of a COOP Implementation Plan within 12 hours of COOP activation, or in fewer than 12 hours if provided advance warning.

### **2.1 Under Secretary for Science or Designee**

- Maintain contact with the Secretary of Energy or designee.
- Provide technical advice, upon request by the Secretary or other government officials.
- Review with the Director, SC, the role in supporting essential functions and supporting activities as defined in the DOE/NNSA COOP Plan (see Section 3).

### **2.2 Director, SC or Designee**

- Update the Under Secretary for Science on SC COOP activities.
- Implement succession plans and delegations of authority, as necessary.
- Provide guidance during COOP activation to SC leadership (i.e., SC-2, SC-3, and SC-4).
- Remain available to the SC representative in the Continuity Emergency Management Team (CEMT) for updates on the COOP situation and guidance regarding SC responses to requests for resources and personnel.
- Communicate with and provide direction, as needed, to SC offices and field sites.

### 2.3 Office of Science Associate Directors

- Maintain current employee contact information.
- As directed by SC leadership, notify employees of COOP activation. Include instructions to report their availability and status including use of RingCentral® on 1-877-363-3631 or office-specific methods for reporting personnel accountability.
- Be ready to support SC-1 from an alternate location or from home.
- Designate a primary and backup person to assist in SC COOP activities such as updating personnel accountability tracking sheets for submission to the SC COOP Coordinator.

### 2.4 SC CEMT Representative

- The SC CEMT representatives staff the designated SC workstation area in the Continuity Emergency Management Center (CEMC), which is located in Germantown xxxx, providing continuous coverage.
- Keep SC leadership informed during a COOP situation.
- Ensure the CEMT has up-to-date SC program information/status by acting as the conduit between the CEMT and SC leadership, located in their offices, AOF, or from home.

**Table 1. SC CEMT Representatives**

<b>CEMT Representative(s)</b>	<b>Role</b>
Associate Director of Science for Safety, Security and Infrastructure (SSI)	Primary Representative
Director, SSI Environment, Safety and Health Division	First Backup
Director, SSI Safeguards and Security Division	Second Backup

### 2.5 SC COOP Coordinators

- Assure activation of SC Notification Path, if necessary, after DOE Dialogic notification.
- Keep SC leadership and SC CEMT representatives informed of COOP activities.
- Coordinate SC COOP activities with the DOE/NNSA Continuity Programs Manager.
- Act as central collection point for SC personnel accountability information and forwarding office to HQ Office of Human Capital.

### 2.6 SC HQ Staff (All Employees)

- Provide supervisors updated contact information.
- When on travel or leave, inform supervisors of location and access method.
- Notify office, via RingCentral system as specified, of contact information for personnel accountability purposes during a COOP event.
- Be ready to support SC from an alternate location or from home.

### 3 Essential Functions and Supporting Activities

The SC focus during a COOP event will be to perform its Mission Essential Functions (MEF) that support the DOE Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEF), as well as perform a set of Essential Support Functions (ESA). All of these activities are defined for the Department in the DOE/NNSA COOP Plan dated January 2010. The essential functions and supporting activities relevant to SC activities are shown in Table 2. In Table 2, Recovery Time Objective refers to the elapsed time between COOP activation and the ability to perform the stated function.

**Table 2. Activities Pertinent to the SC**

Description	Recovery Time Objective
<p><b>PMEF 1: Maintain the safety and security of nuclear materials in the DOE complex at fixed sites and in transit.</b></p>	<p>Within 12 hours</p>
<p><b>MEF 1:</b> Safeguards and security of nuclear materials (material, weapons, and devices) at DOE sites and facilities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HQ provides management and direction (SECON level change)</li> <li>• Field implements</li> <li>• Securely handle, store, and transfer nuclear materials at all times</li> <li>• Validate nuclear materials inventories (accountability)</li> </ul>	<p>Immediate</p>
<p><b>MEF 17:</b> Maintain technical expertise to respond to a national emergency (function of DOE and other Departments and Agencies)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HQ provides management and direction</li> <li>• DOE field/national laboratories perform tasks</li> </ul>	<p>Within 12 hours</p>

Description	Recovery Time Objective
<p><b>PMEF 2: Respond to a nuclear incident, both domestically and internationally, caused by terrorist activity, natural disaster or accident, including mobilizing the resources to support these efforts.</b></p>	<p>Within 12 hours</p>
<p><b>MEF 16:</b> Maintain nuclear facilities in a safe, environmentally compliant and cost-effective manner to support national priorities in order to respond to a national emergency (functions of DOE and other Departments and Agencies)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HQ provides management and direction</li> <li>• DOE field/national laboratories perform tasks</li> <li>• Respond to a nuclear incident, both domestically and internationally, resulting from terrorist activity, natural disaster, or accident</li> <li>• Provide technical expertise on nuclear and radiological matters and available analytical capabilities of DOE sites and national laboratories</li> </ul>	<p>Within 12 hours</p>
<p><b>Essential Supporting Activities (ESA's):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide executive-level Departmental command, control, leadership, and management of DOE's Program Secretarial Officers and field offices</li> <li>• Ensure the availability of Information Technology</li> <li>• Ensure the availability of communication systems</li> <li>• Provide security of DOE programs and facilities</li> <li>• Provide for the health, safety, security and accountability of human capital</li> <li>• Support critical human capital management systems</li> </ul>	<p>Within 12 hours</p>

## 4 Authorities and References

- Federal Preparedness Circular 65, Federal Executive Branch Continuity of Operations, June 15, 2004.
- DOE/NNSA Continuity of Operations Plan, January 2010.
- DOE Order 243.2, *Vital Records*, February 2, 2006.
- National Security Presidential Directive 51 (NSPD 51)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 (HSPD 20), *National Continuity Policy*, May 9, 2007.
- Federal Continuity Directives 1 (FCD 1) and 2 (FCD 2), February 2008.
- DOE O 150.1, *Continuity Programs*, May 8, 2008.
- Office of Science Management System (SCMS), Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Management System, Emergency Operations Subject Area, Procedure 4: Preparation of the Continuity Program, April 21, 2009.

## 5 Concept of Operations

When an emergency that significantly threatens the downtown Washington, DC area occurs, the DOE/NNSA Continuity Program Manager, after consultation with the Secretary of Energy or successor, activates the DOE/NNSA COOP. When this happens, COOP planning addresses four separate, but overlapping phases: readiness and preparedness (Phase I), activation and relocation (Phase II), continuity operations (Phase III), and reconstitution (Phase IV).

### 5.1 Phase I - Readiness and Preparedness

This phase includes planning, training, and assessment. During this phase, the SC COOP plan is reviewed and revised as necessary in response to changing conditions. Training for employees is developed and implemented in Phase I. A program of testing and exercising the SC COOP Implementation Plan is conducted in order to be prepared to effectively handle a COOP situation.

The final element of this phase is the assurance of readiness through a program of assessment in which SC HQ and field elements implement Continuity Readiness Assurance Programs to ensure that the essential functions and supporting activities can be successfully performed during a continuity event. These programs may be part of emergency management readiness assurance activities. Detailed requirements for the Continuity Readiness Assurance Program are found in DOE Order 150.1, Chapter I, Continuity Program Requirements, Section 7, Readiness Assurance.

### 5.2 Phase II - Activation and Relocation


This phase includes the following activities.

- Notification of DOE/NNSA COOP activation is disseminated to SC staff with instructions on activities.
- Predetermined roles and responsibilities are verified with designated SC individuals.

- Performance of essential functions is ensured.
- Personnel relocate as necessary to the Alternate Operating Facility in Germantown, MD. (See Annex D for additional details).
- Devolution of control and direction to the Oak Ridge Office (ORO), if SC Headquarters is implemented if Germantown is unable to maintain operations.
- Employees telework, if possible.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency Operations Center, at the direction of the White House, may direct Departments and Agencies to take specific measures to increase readiness to facilitate accelerated activation of COOP plans. The resultant DOE transition to a COOP Condition (COOPCON) Alert/Readiness Level is directed by the Secretary of Energy (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1. COOP Condition Alert Levels**



COOPCON Level 1 is the highest level and requires that DOE/NNSA ensure that alternate operating facilities can be activated with no notice. COOPCON Level 2 requires readiness for activation of alternate operating facilities within 4 hours of notice. Level 3 and Level 4 are require readiness for full operations in 8 and 12 hours, respectively. (See Annex A for more information.)

### 5.2.1 Notification

When the highest level of alert is declared by the White House or when a decision is made by the Secretary of Energy to activate the DOE COOP Plan, the DOE Headquarters' Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Dialogic Notification System provides notification to SC HQ


leadership, field site key personnel, and SC COOP coordinators. The detailed plan for notification of SC senior leadership and employees is found in Annex B and Annex C.

Following notification, SC senior leadership, SC COOP team members, and the CEMT representatives will determine the appropriate level of response required by SC and further disseminate corresponding notifications to SC personnel (see Figure 2). Employees will be notified, depending on the circumstances and the nature of their work to:

- Relocate locally by reporting to alternate office space or an office of convenience where operations are being performed;
- Deploy to a specific work location to support the Department's response effort; or
- Remain at home or in a safe location, and in close communication with a supervisor.



**Figure 2. SC Notification Path**



The DOE COOP activation is tied specifically to situations that may affect the Washington, DC area. Local emergencies that significantly affect an SC site may not be viewed as affecting the readiness posture of the DOE in general, and would not necessarily elevate the COOPCON level. A local emergency could, however, be viewed as having national consequences and would cause the COOPCON level to be elevated. Since activation of a field site COOP plan is based on localized events and information, the decision to activate a COOP plan at a field site is a localized decision. In the field, the decision maker, or designee, implements the continuity notification procedures. Field sites, likewise, notify the DOE HQ Watch Office in the event of a field site COOP activation.

The DOE/NNSA Continuity Program Manager will ensure notification is made to appropriate personnel based on information provided by each program element, or field sites, regarding actions being taken by DOE Headquarters personnel.

### **5.2.2 Relocation**

The Alternate Operating Facility, or AOF, for SC is located at the DOE facility in Germantown, Maryland. If that facility is not accessible, the SC Director or his designee will make the decision to institute the devolution of SC operations to the secondary AOF, the Oak Ridge Office (ORO) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The ORO can serve as a short-term remote AOF, and is used when long-term remote operations are not likely or necessary. More information on devolution is included in section 5.3.

## **5.3 Phase III - Continuity Operations**

As soon as possible, SC management will establish communications with its SC HQ offices and field offices. Each SC HQ office will be asked to account for all of its employees. All means of communications will be used to establish contacts with employees. Employees will be required to report in using either the RingCentral system by dialing 1-877-363-3631 and using their organization's assigned extension, or using office-specific reporting systems.

Upon activation of the COOP, SC CEMT representatives report to SC's station in the Germantown, Maryland DOE facility, room **XXXX**. At that time, the Continuity Emergency Response Group (CERG) is also formed, consisting of the Secretary or designated successor, the CEMT, and the Continuity Support Team (see Figure 3). The CERG is responsible for:

- Verifying orders of succession at the DOE and SC levels (see Annex E) and implementing delegations of authority.
- Ensuring performance of essential functions and supporting activities.
- Establishing and sustaining operations.
- Maintaining communications with field activities.
- Verifying access to vital records.
- Conducting accountability of personnel.
- Providing situation reports to the DOE/NNSA Continuity Program Manager.


### **5.3.1 Vital Records and Databases**

Vital Records are those SC records that must be preserved, protected, and available. The following records are considered Vital Records for SC and are available via backup system or SC COOP Portal for access by SC Program Offices or the Oak Ridge Office devolution site:

- **Redacted**

SC specific vital records for conducting Essential Supporting Functions will be made available by SC-45, Office of Business Policy and Operations, in accordance with DOE Order 243.2, *Vital Records*.

**Figure 3. DOE HQ Continuity Emergency Response Group (CERG)**



### 5.3.2 Operations Integration with Overall DOE/NNSA Continuity of Operations Plan

The CERG will accomplish the initial DOE response to activation of the DOE/NNSA Continuity Plan and coordinate with the DOE Watch Office and other government agencies. The teams comprising the CERG are organized into functional areas and staffed by designated personnel who respond per the direction and guidance of their individual offices, this plan, and the Secretary of Energy. Team members are identified in advance and issued a designation letter by their respective offices, identifying their specific duties and responsibilities.

The CEMT, as part of the CERG, becomes the central clearinghouse for information and response activities by monitoring the situation, including information from media coverage, intelligence sources, and within the Department, by providing situational awareness to DOE

decision makers. The CEMT will ensure that the Department response is coordinated with all appropriate HQ-level offices and serve as the initial Departmental point-of-contact for national level coordination. The CEMT will report directly to the Secretary. The CEMT is made up of representatives from every DOE HQ organization and is headed by the Director of Emergency Operations.

The SC Continuity Emergency Management Team (CEMT) is responsible for the overall coordination of continuity activities within SC and the CERG including operations support, logistical support, and planning support.

### **5.3.3 Devolution Command and Control**

When DOE/NNSA HQ leadership is unable to relocate and establish operations at an alternate operating facility quickly, the DOE devolution option may be implemented. In this case, the senior DOE official in the order of succession who is able to assume leadership responsibility will assume control of the Department's Mission Essential Functions. The orders of succession for SC are provided in Annex E.

The purpose of devolution of SC control and direction to a remote facility is to ensure the continuation of SC essential functions in the event that DOE/NNSA HQ is incapacitated and HQ personnel are unavailable or incapable of deploying to the Germantown Alternate Operating Facility. For such situations, SC senior leadership responsibility will devolve to the designated SC devolution site at the ORO. There are three cases where devolution would occur to assure SC leadership via the SC orders of succession.

- SC HQ calls the devolution site to convey the message that it is unable to perform its essential functions and is turning over control (authority and responsibility) to the designated official.
- SC HQ is in such a state that communication with SC sites is not possible. Following the SC orders of succession, the devolution site automatically assumes leadership responsibility and establishes communications with all SC field sites until HQ communications and control can be re-established.
- SC HQ directs the devolution site manager to handle some or all of SC essential functions while SC HQ leadership transitions to the devolution site.

### **5.4 Phase IV - Reconstitution**

Planning and reconstitution begins as soon as possible following COOP activation to minimize the time required to resume normal operations. When Departmental operations stabilize, the Secretary of Energy, designee, or successor will appoint a reconstitution manager. This individual will convene a working group consisting of senior representatives to develop and implement a specific reconstitution plan of action. SC will participate in the

working group and notify senior leadership or their designees, of the reconstitution plan of action.

## **6 Pandemic Influenza Response**

Pandemic Influenza presents a unique challenge for continuity planning and implementation. The DOE/NNSA COOP Plan requires the ability to function for 60 days in the event of a pandemic disease situation. While many of the basic continuity concepts are applicable, the traditional idea of relocating personnel, or functions, to an Alternate Operating Facility may not be an effective response when it is likely that the pandemic influenza equally and simultaneously affects some facilities. Therefore, a more flexible approach to ensuring the continued performance of essential functions is necessary. The primary emphasis will be for management and workforce to use telework to minimize employee contact and movement. See Annex F for more details on pandemic planning.

SC will consider the two following options:

### 1) Alternative work arrangements:

- Personnel work from home (telework);
- Working hours are adjusted (shift work) to minimize the number of people who are at work, in any one office, at one time (social distancing);
- MEFs are transferred to facilities that are not experiencing severe absenteeism;
- Personnel wear protective equipment to minimize exposure and spread of infection; and
- Selected personnel, who must be at work, quarantine themselves for some period of time.

2) Use of an AOF in Germantown, MD, or devolution to ORO if they are not impacted by the pandemic influenza at the same time as Headquarters.

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## **Annex A – Continuity of Operations Condition (COOPCON) Alert Levels**

The Continuity Conditions represent an acknowledgement that circumstances may occur during which an increase in the Federal Government’s readiness to implement Continuity Plans is desired. These circumstances include indications of increased threat conditions or the existence of a particularly attractive target or event that might increase the impact of a terrorist attack.

Each of the Continuity Conditions represents a degree of “leaning forward,” from the normal (Condition 4) to a very high (Condition 1) state of readiness. (See the description of each COOPCON level below). During the various COOPCON’s, the DOE/NNSA Continuity Plan has not been “activated” therefore, regular business will continue to be performed at Primary Operating Facilities. Personnel may be deployed to an Alternate Operating Facility, as outlined below, to meet requirements of the designated COOPCON, but may conduct normal business from the AOF as well. These COOPCON Alert Levels correspond exactly to the COGCON Alert Levels for the Washington, DC Metropolitan area.

### **COOPCON 4 (Lowest) – Normal Operations**

COOPCON 4 indicates normal operations for DOE Headquarters. This includes:

- Regular business is conducted at the Primary Operating Facilities.
- DOE Offices must be capable of fully activating the Continuity Plan within twelve (12) hours.
- Routine Continuity training and exercises are conducted.

### **COOPCON 3 – Increase Readiness**

COOPCON 3 increases readiness and reduces the time required to activate fully the Continuity Plan. This includes:

- Regular business is conducted at the Primary Operating Facilities.
- Continuity rosters, plans, and procedures should be reviewed and updated.
- Individual DOE Offices must be capable of fully activating their Continuity Implementation Plans within eight (8) hours and assuming COOPCON 2 within four (4) hours. This means personnel who may be required to relocate on short notice should be identified, notified, and prepared to relocate.
- Additional training activities to increase readiness (e.g. notification tests and tabletop exercises) should be conducted.
- Field Elements should be contacted advising them of the situation and ensuring their readiness to support Office Continuity operations as necessary.
- DOE shall conduct at least one additional internal agency communications test between Alternate Operating Facility sites and Field Elements within 24 hours of notification.
- Locations of the Secretary of Energy and successors shall be tracked on a daily basis to ensure leadership is accessible and aware of the increased Continuity Condition.

- Every DOE Headquarters Office shall report completion of their increased COOPCON preparations to the Continuity Programs Office within 24 hours of notification.

### **COOPCON 2 – Increase Readiness**

COOPCON 2 further increases readiness and further reduces the time required to activate the Continuity Plan. In addition to the requirements for COOPCON 3, this includes:

- Regular business is conducted at the Primary Operating Facilities.
- Individual DOE Offices must be capable of fully activating the Continuity Plan within four (4) hours, including advance deployment of sufficient staff to the Alternate Operating Facility to facilitate Continuity activation.
- Appropriate and sufficient personnel should be designated “on call” and either relocate or be prepared to do so to support the required short response time during both duty and non-duty hours.
- Preparations for increased use of telework should be considered and implemented, as appropriate.
- Systems, equipment and reference materials at the Alternate Operating Facilities should be checked.
- Field Elements should be contacted advising them of the situation and ensuring their readiness to support Office Continuity operations as necessary.
- Program and Staff Offices should conduct communications tests with applicable interagency partners from Alternate Operating Facilities within 48 hours and repeat no less than weekly.
- Locations of the Secretary of Energy and successors shall be tracked on a daily basis to ensure leadership is accessible and aware of the increased Continuity Condition.
- Ensure at least one DOE Secretarial successor is out of the National Capital Region at all times.
- Individual DOE Offices should track their successor locations and ensure designated successors have reliable communications with DOE AOFs and are aware of critical activities.
- The Continuity Management Response Team will monitor and track major DOE HQ activities and Continuity Preparedness.
- Conduct additional internal agency communications tests between the Alternate Operating Facilities and Field Activities within 24 hours and repeat no less than weekly.
- Every DOE Headquarters Office shall report completion of their increased COOPCON preparations to the Continuity Programs Office within 24 hours of notification.

### **COOPCON 1 – (Highest)**

COOPCON 1 increases readiness to enable instant activation of the Continuity Plan. In addition to the requirements for COOPCON 2, this includes:

- DOE Headquarters must be able to fully activate the entire Continuity Plan and perform Essential Functions from the Alternate Operating Facility immediately.
- A full Continuity Emergency Response Group is in a “deployed stand-by” condition at the Alternate Operating Facility.

- At least one DOE Secretarial successor shall be deployed to the Alternate Operating Facility.
- The Continuity Emergency Management Team (CEMT) will be stood up at the Alternate Operating Facility and monitor and track major Headquarters activities.
- Regular business is conducted at the Primary Operating Facilities. However, some routine activities may be conducted at the Alternate Operating Facility.
- Program and Staff Offices should conduct communications tests with applicable interagency partners from Alternate Operating Facilities within 48 hours and repeat no less than weekly.
- Increased use of Telework should be implemented.
- Internal DOE communications between normal operating locations (Headquarters and Field Offices) will be tested daily.
- Shift work will be required to support 24/7 operations of the Alternate Operating Facility.



## Annex B – COOP Communication, Responsibilities and Checklists

This Annex provides information on: 1) the DOE notification system via DIALOGIC automated messaging system, 2) other means of communication and 3) COOP checklists.

### DOE Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Dialogic Notification System

#### SC HQ Personnel on Dialogic Notification System:

Redacted

#### Automated Dialing Sequence:

- During Work Hours: Work Phone/Cell Phone/Blackberry/Home Phone
- After Work Hours: Home Phone/Cell Phone/Blackberry/Work Phone
- If the system gets an answering machine, it will leave message to call designated phone number to receive message.
- If the system gets no response after the first round of calls, it will wait a designated period of time (currently 30 minutes) and try again.

1. Access the Dialogic system to retrieve messages by dialing 301-~~xxx-xxxx~~
2. The system will request you to enter a code [**last 5 digits of you work desk phone**].
3. The system will then play a pre-recorded message containing situation information.

### Other Means of Communication

SC Senior leadership may need to access the Government Emergency Telecommunication Service (GETS) and the Wireless Priority Service (WPS) during a COOP situation as follows:

- a) **GETS** allows the Continuity Emergency Response Group (CERG) community to communicate over existing Public Switched Telecommunication Network (PSTN) paths with a high likelihood of call completion during the most severe conditions of high-traffic congestion and disruption. For more information or to request a GETS Card, please contact Matt Cole at 301-903-8388, or Judith Blackistone at 301-903-6800.
- b) **WPS** gives authorized CERG personnel priority access to available cellular resources during emergency situations. In addition, WPS is complementary to and can be used in conjunction with the Government Emergency Telecommunication Service (GETS). This ensures a high probability of call completion in both the landline and cellular portions of the PSTN. WPS serves CERG needs while minimizing impact on the general public's access to the same cellular infrastructure. For more information or to get WPS Service, please contact Matt Cole at 301-903-8388, or Judith Blackistone at 301-903-6800.

GETS and WPS services must be tested at least quarterly by those persons who have this capability. Otherwise, the service will be discontinued for the user.

## **Operational Checklists**

### Notification

- SC COOP Team and SC Senior Leadership receive notification from Dialogic.
- SC COOP Team and SC Senior Leadership (SC-1, SC-2, SC-3, and SC-4) discuss the course of action to be taken based on the notification from Dialogic and situation information. If the decision is to invoke an SC COOP Implementation Plan, then:
  - SC COOP Coordinator confirms that SC COOP Team members have received notifications to initiate the SC Notification Path (See Figure 2, on Page 9).
  - SC-1 notifies SC-2, SC-3, and SC-4.
  - SC-2 notifies their Associate Directors.
    - SC Associate Directors notify their respective employees.
  - SC-3 notifies their Associate Directors and the SC-CH & SC-OR Office Managers.
    - SC Associate Directors notify their respective employees.
    - SC-CH & SC-OR Office Managers notify their designated SC Site Office Managers.
  - SC-4 notifies their Associate Directors.
    - SC Associate Directors notify their respective employees.

### Relocation

The relocation process consists of moving operations to an AOF to perform Essential Functions during or following a disruption. If both headquarters locations (FORS and GTN) are inaccessible and a threat exists throughout the National Capital Region, DOE, DOE Headquarters Program and Staff Offices, SC staff who serve on the DOE CERG team may relocate to remote alternative operating facilities. For SC, one such alternative operating facility is the Oak Ridge Office. See Annex D - Alternate Operating Facilities Information for driving directions and contact information.

### **What to Take to the SC Alternate Operating Facility**

- DOE Badge
- DOE cellular phone
- Government Emergency Telecommunication Service (GETS) Card – for priority access to telecommunication lines (test access quarterly)
- DOE Blackberry/Pager (batteries) and DOE Laptop Computer (if issued)
- SC COOP Implementation Plan
- Essential Information necessary for your SC mission(s)/function(s)
- Government Credit Card
- Cash or Traveler's Checks
- Prescription Medications

## **Response Activities**

### **SC Director/Successor**

- Obtain briefing on DOE COOP Activation Status related to –
  - Current status of event for COOP Activation
  - Current status of SC communication with the CERG and CEMT
  - Current status of DOE SECON levels
  - What SC elements have successfully received notification of DOE COOP activation?
  - Status of Forrestal (and Germantown) buildings and employees
  - Who has arrived and who is expected to report to SC COOP GTN location **redacted**
- Ensure that necessary contact information and mechanisms for maintaining contact with Secretary of Energy/Successor
- Assign responsibilities and actions to SC staff as needed
- Assure that a SC CEMT representative has reported to Room **xxxx** (GTN)
- Review the SC Mission Essential Function (MEF) and Essential Supporting Functions (ESA), as identified
- Confirm operation access to SC Vital Records for performing SC Essential Functions
- Determine need to perform any SC MEF/ESA at an SC Devolution Site
- Keep activity log – example included

### **SC Representative to DOE HQ CEMT**

- Report and check in at Room **xxxx** (GTN) or elsewhere as directed
- Establish/maintain contact with SC Director/Successor in **redacted**
- Ensure that CEMT has up-to-date SC Program information/status
- Ensure that SC provides 24/7 CEMT coverage
- Keep activity log – example included

### **SC COOP Coordinator**

- Assure SC Notification Path activation is successful to notify and account for SC employees
- Assure operational readiness of SC COOP location in **redacted**
- Coordinate SC COOP activities with DOE Continuity Program Manager
- Keep SC COOP leadership informed of COOP activities
- Keep activity log from the beginning of a notification to the conclusion of the event. Example of the activity log is on the next page



## **Annex C – SC Personnel Assignments**

This Annex **has been redacted for the public version of this document.**

**Call List for SC-1, Office of Science, Office of the Director**

**Call List for SC-2, Deputy Director for Science Programs**

**Call List for SC-2, Deputy Director for Science Programs, continued**

**Call List for SC-3, Deputy Director for Field Operations**

**Call List for SC-4, Deputy Director for Resource Management**

**Site Office Manager Contact List – SC-CH Contacts**

**Site Office Manager Contact List – SC-OR Contacts**

## ***Annex D – Alternate Operating Facilities and Devolution Site Information***

**DOE Germantown**

**redacted**

**Germantown, MD 20874**

Facility Layout

**Redacted**

## Annex E – Orders of Succession

This Annex has been partially redacted for the public version of this document as updated Secretary of Energy information is available in RevCom and Director Office of Science information is located in SCMS.

### Delegations of Authority

The Department of Energy(DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has clearly established delegations of authority, which are essential to ensuring that DOE/NNSA personnel understand their authority and the limits of their authority during a crisis. The following documents include the conditions under which authority transfers and when it is terminated.

- The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-438, 42 USC 5801)
- Delegation of Firearms and Arrest Authority
- Additional Delegations of Authority as needed

To ensure a rapid response to any emergency and to minimize disruptions that require the implementation of continuity plans, the Department has pre-delegated the authority to make policy determinations and decisions, at the headquarters, regional, field, satellite, and other levels and agency locations, as appropriate. A delegation of authority identifies who is authorized to act on behalf of the agency head or other officials for specified purposes and ensures that designated individuals have the legal authorities to carry out their duties. To the extent possible, these authorities are identified by title or position, and not by the individual office holder's name. Generally, predetermined delegations of authority will take effect when normal channels of direction are disrupted and will terminate when these channels are reestablished. Delegation of authority is an essential part of Department's continuity planning and should reach to a sufficient depth and have sufficient breadth—at least three positions deep and geographically dispersed where feasible—to ensure the Department can perform its essential functions while remaining a viable part of the Federal Government during the course of any continuity event. To ensure their legal sufficiency and clarity, delegations of authority must have the following characteristics:

1. A delegation of authority must document in advance (where designated) the legal authority for officials (including those below the level of agency head) to make key policy decisions during a continuity situation.
2. To ensure the Department's Primary Mission Essential Functions and Mission Essential Functions are performed; delegations of authority must be planned and documented in advance of an incident and in accordance with applicable laws, including :
  - a) Delineating the limits of authority and accountability;

- b) Outlining explicitly in a statement, the authority (including any exceptions to that authority) of an official so designated to exercise department/office direction, and the authority of an official to re-delegate functions and activities, as appropriate; and
  - c) Defining the circumstances under which delegation of authorities would take effect and would be terminated.
3. Delegations of authority must ensure that those officials who might be expected to assume authorities in a continuity situation are properly informed and trained, as required, to carry out their emergency responsibilities. Training of these officials will be conducted at least annually.
  4. Delegations of authority must ensure the orderly (and predefined) transition of leadership, for the Secretary of Energy as well as for the Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and key supporting positions, within the Department during a continuity event. Delegations are closely tied to succession.
  5. Delegations of authority must be included in the vital records and be available at the appropriate continuity facilities (alternate operating facilities and devolution sites) in the event the continuity plan is activated.



## **Annex F – Pandemic Influenza**

Reference: DOE/NNSA Continuity of Operations Plan, January 2010

### **Introduction**

Pandemic influenza presents a unique challenge for continuity planning and implementation. While many of the basic continuity concepts (including Orders of Succession, Essential Functions, Vital Records, etc.) are applicable, the traditional idea of relocating personnel, or functions, to an Alternate Operating Facility (AOF) may not be an effective response if the pandemic influenza equally impacts the AOFs. Therefore, a more flexible approach to ensuring the continued performance of Essential Functions is necessary.

Influenza pandemics are global outbreaks of a new virus that are easily spread from person to person. Because individuals do not have immunity to the virus, the severity of these outbreaks may be unpredictable. While history offers useful benchmarks, there is no way to know the characteristics of a specific pandemic virus until it emerges. While the focus of the Federal Government's 2005 planning was based on the H5N1 virus (avian flu) pandemic associated with high mortality, the Federal Government and the Department of Energy had to re-evaluate these plans to address a possible 2009 H1N1 influenza (swine flu) pandemic. This experience has shown us that pandemic planning must remain flexible.

### **Assumptions**

The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, issued in May 2006 by the Homeland Security Council, identifies planning criteria for Federal Departments and Agencies under the following assumptions.

- Everyone may be susceptible to the disease, especially those at high risk (pregnant women; persons who are being treated for cancer, or have other underlying medical conditions);
- Medical response capabilities may be overwhelmed;
- The impacts of pandemic influenza are likely to come in waves, each lasting weeks to months. Multiple waves can be expected;
- Absenteeism could reach up to 40 percent for periods of up to 2 weeks at the peak, with lesser absenteeism at other times;
- The typical incubation period for influenza is 2 days, but it can be longer; and
- Individuals may become infected, and therefore contagious, for up to 7 days; symptoms may be mild to serious; some personnel may become infected, but not display symptoms.

DOE organizations need to align their plans (e.g., altering operations, flexible work schedules, sick leave, social distancing, telework, shutting down operations in affected areas, etc.), with the following:

- The Federal Government Response Stages;
- The Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation;
- The Center for Disease Control's Intervals, Triggers, and Actions Framework; and
- The DOE/NNSA COOP Plan.

### **Response Requirements**

The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza clarifies the responsibilities of the Federal Government. Each department/agency's plan must:

- First and foremost, protect the health of employees;
- Maintain MEFs and ESAs during times of significant absenteeism;
- Support the Federal response; and
- Communicate guidance to stakeholders.

### **COOP Concepts during a Pandemic**

Traditional COOP concepts (i.e. relocating personnel) may not be a viable option during a Pandemic as the risk or disruption may spread across the country in a short time. Nevertheless, essential functions must still be performed.

A pandemic does not automatically force a continuity event. A continuity event will only result from a pandemic when the organization's self-determined threshold is surpassed. When absenteeism reaches a level that precludes an organization from continuing its essential functions, COOP must be implemented.

Every DOE organization under the purview of this Plan is required to have a Pandemic section within their COOP Implementation Plan. During a pandemic that requires COOP to be implemented, all continuity capabilities must be addressed just as with traditional COOP, however, as a minimum the following list of issues must be addressed in the Pandemic portion of the COOP Implementation Plans.

- How pandemic guidance and information will be communicated to its employees, Federal Government, and contractor.
- Consult with leadership, local and headquarters Human Capital offices and labor relations to determine the best courses of action to take for contractual arrangements.

- Define an absenteeism threshold that prevents your organization from continuing its essential functions (i.e., below 40 percent manning our essential functions cannot be continued at this location).
- Telework issues, including who can perform required ESAs that support MEFs/Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs) from home or a designated telework location. Everyone authorized to telework should have an existing telework agreement signed and validated.
- If applicable, certify additional personnel to execute required ESAs to continue essential functions when primary personnel cannot.
- If telework and additional personnel backup aren't viable options to continue essential functions, devolution must be considered. Is there another Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration organization that can perform the essential functions required to support the Department's PMEFs? If your organization doesn't already have a Devolution Plan, urgent consideration should be given to developing one.
- What is your recovery plan? How are you transitioning back to normal operations?

### **Being Flexible: Other Planning Considerations**

- The Office of Health, Safety and Security has compiled a comprehensive pandemic website that has a wealth of planning recommendations and informative data. Search the website <http://www.hss.doe.gov/healthsafety/pandemic.html> for this and more valuable information.
- Adjust work hours (shift work) to minimize the number of people who are at one location at a specific time;
- Separate individuals 3-6 feet in a office (social distancing) or using teleconferences; and
- Voluntary quarantine should be considered for selected personnel who must be at work (classified work or work requiring specialized equipment).
- Where will the Senior Leadership be working?
- What work must be performed in the office?
- Have Orders of Succession and Delegations of Authority been prepared to enable back-up personnel to perform MEFs?
- Are there backup plans if communication infrastructure fails?
- Are vital records backed up and available for sustained operations for 60 days?

- Are vital “supply chains” protected and understood to minimize disruption?
- How will work among the various Program Site and Staff Offices be coordinated?

The Department’s national security and infrastructure support missions require timely, comprehensive, and practical preparation for a pandemic. These preparations must reflect the utmost concern for the safety and health of the DOE workers and ensure the continued performance of the Department’s Essential Functions.

Pandemic threatens an organization’s human resources by removing essential personnel from the workplace anywhere from days, to weeks, to months. It is critical that DOE anticipates and plans for the potential impact of a pandemic by first caring for its employees, both before and during a pandemic, and continuing its essential functions.

Remember, a pandemic may not require COOP. But in case COOP implementation becomes necessary, preparedness is the key to a seamless transition to continue the Department’s essential functions.

### **Biological Event Monitoring Team**

Dr. Daniel W. Drell, a biologist and member of the Life and Medical Science Division of the Office of Science is the current SC representative of the Biological Event Monitoring Team (BEMT). He can be reached on 301-903-4742 or [Daniel.drell@science.doe.gov](mailto:Daniel.drell@science.doe.gov). This team was originally established by the Department of Energy (DOE) Deputy Secretary on March 29, 2006, in support of the President’s national Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. The Purpose of the BEMT is to provide expert advice to the Department with regard to evaluating infectious disease threats, formulating recommendations to protect the health of DOE employees and maintaining essential functions, promoting worker health education, coordinating the Department’s response, and providing advice on specific actions necessary for plan implementation.

## Pandemic Influenza vs. COOP Procedures

This comparison is provided as a guide to explain the specific differences between the response to a COOP event and a Pandemic Influenza or other pandemic disease situation.

<b>DOE COOP Elements</b>	<b>COOP Regular Implementation Guidance</b>	<b>Pandemic Influenza Response Planning Considerations</b>
<b>Plans and Procedures</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Decision to activate COOP Plan.</li> <li>▪ Notification.</li> <li>▪ Relocation to Alternate Operating Facility.</li> <li>▪ Establish Operations.</li> <li>▪ Sustain Operations.</li> <li>▪ Reconstitution.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To reduce a pandemic influenza threat, a portion of the implementation plan's objectives should be to minimize the health, social, and economic impact on the United States.</li> <li>▪ Plans must be capable of maintaining sustained operations until normal business activity can be reconstituted, which may be longer than 60 days.</li> <li>▪ Review and update plans to ensure essential services can be provided if employee absenteeism reaches 40 percent.</li> <li>▪ Different activation phases may be based on pandemic influenza alert levels, proximity of outbreak to organization's offices/facilities, and reoccurring outbreaks.</li> <li>▪ Appoint a senior manager and identify essential stakeholders as part of an Influenza Team that addresses issues related to pandemic influenza planning.</li> <li>▪ Health focus will be needed to minimize the effects of a pandemic influenza on staff and operations.</li> </ul>

<b>DOE COOP Elements</b>	<b>COOP Regular Implementation Guidance</b>	<b>Pandemic Influenza Response Planning Considerations</b>
<b>Mission Essential Functions and Essential Supporting Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Define Mission Essential Functions and Essential Supporting Activities.</li> <li>▪ Define priority of each function/activity.</li> <li>▪ How soon can function/activity be restored?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Re-examine the Mission Essential Functions/Activities considering the dynamic nature of a pandemic influenza.</li> <li>▪ Re-examine prioritization of Mission Essential Functions/Activities resulting from duration and personnel impact.</li> <li>▪ Identify Mission Essential Functions/Activities that cannot be performed from home or other locations.</li> <li>▪ Identify Mission Essential Functions that can be deferred until staff levels increase.</li> <li>▪ Identify critical systems and operations that can be redistributed and supported from other offices.</li> <li>▪ Understand essential “supply chain” or contractor services (e.g., security, sanitation) and how they may be affected by a pandemic influenza, the impact on DOE operations, and possible mitigation solutions.</li> <li>▪ Consider the need for cross training to ensure essential staffs are available to perform functions/activities.</li> </ul>

<b>DOE COOP Elements</b>	<b>COOP Regular Implementation Guidance</b>	<b>Pandemic Influenza Response Planning Considerations</b>
<b>Orders of Succession and Delegations of Authority</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Determine Order of Succession</li> <li>▪ Availability of Successor</li> <li>▪ Authority and Accountability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Because a pandemic influenza may affect regions of the United States differently in terms of timing, severity, and duration, Departmental elements with geographically dispersed assets and personnel should consider dispersing the Order of Succession.</li> <li>▪ Plan for orders of successions that are at least three deep per position to take into account the expected rate of absenteeism.</li> <li>▪ Plan for geographical dispersion of orders of succession, taking into account the regional nature and possibility of different Orders of Succession depending on the spread of the pandemic influenza.</li> <li>▪ Because absenteeism may reach a peak of 40 percent at the height of a pandemic wave, Delegations of Authority are critical.</li> <li>▪ Plan for Delegations of Authority that are at least three deep per responsibility to take into account the expected rate of absenteeism.</li> <li>▪ Plan for geographical dispersion of Delegations of Authority, taking into account the regional nature of an outbreak.</li> <li>▪ Plan for MOUs and MOAs for transferring work.</li> </ul>
<b>Vital Records and Databases</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Define Records that must be preserved and protected</li> <li>▪ Define storage of Vital Records</li> <li>▪ Ensure that records are available</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Pandemic influenza implementation planning must identify, and ensure the integrity of, vital systems that require periodic maintenance or other direct physical intervention by employees.</li> <li>▪ Identify records needed to sustain operations for 60 days, or longer, because vital records at Alternate Operating Facilities may not be accessible. Determine whether files will be accessed electronically from a remote location (e.g., an employee's home) in accordance with CIO requirements, especially those dealing with Personal Identifiable Information and other sensitive agency information.</li> <li>▪ Identify and plan for maintenance of vital systems that rely on periodic physical intervention/servicing by essential individuals.</li> </ul>

<b>DOE COOP Elements</b>	<b>COOP Regular Implementation Guidance</b>	<b>Pandemic Influenza Response Planning Considerations</b>
<b>Human Capital</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Designation of Mission Essential Employees</li> <li>▪ Accountability of Employees</li> <li>▪ Employee’s roles and responsibilities</li> <li>▪ Status of non-emergency employees</li> <li>▪ Staffing flexibilities</li> <li>▪ Pay and Benefit issues</li> <li>▪ Supporting employees and their families impacted by an emergency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Each Program/Staff Office must develop, update, exercise, and implement, when necessary, comprehensive plans to protect its workforce. Although a pandemic influenza will not directly affect the physical infrastructure of an organization, a pandemic influenza will ultimately threaten all operations by its impact on an organization’s human resources. The health threat to personnel is the primary threat to operations during a pandemic influenza.</li> <li>▪ Coordinate human capital efforts with the DOE’s Office of Human Capital, following guidance issued by OPM.</li> <li>▪ Coordinate modifications to human capital policies and plans with labor relations.</li> <li>▪ Identify potential impact/implications of pandemic influenza on employees.</li> <li>▪ Update human capital and organizational policies, as appropriate, and in accordance with guidance issued by OPM, including but not limited to those policies for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Compensation for nonessential and essential employees</li> <li>- Annual leave</li> <li>- Sick leave (voluntary and mandatory)</li> <li>- Family medical leave</li> <li>- Grievance</li> <li>- Telework (Flexiplace)</li> <li>- Flexible work schedules</li> <li>- Benefits</li> <li>- Backups for essential personnel</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Develop, in accordance with guidance issued by OPM, an employee tracking system to monitor leave, telecommuting, and deaths due to the pandemic virus. The employee tracking system must comply with the requirement of the Privacy Act.</li> <li>▪ Activate toolsets to provide employees with relevant information and advisories about the pandemic influenza, including <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hotlines</li> <li>- Web sites</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Voice Messaging System Alerts.</p>

<b>DOE COOP Elements</b>	<b>COOP Regular Implementation Guidance</b>	<b>Pandemic Influenza Response Planning Considerations</b>
<b>Human Capital (cont.)</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Provide guidance to staff for developing “work-at-home emergency kits” to facilitate telework efforts. (see DOE Handbook on DOE – Flex for additional Guidance)</li> <li>▪ Provide guidance, awareness plans and materials developed by HHS and CDC for employees in the following areas: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Infection control</li> <li>– Personal hygiene</li> <li>– Social distancing techniques.</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Stand up Employee/Family Assistance Centers for employees and their families, to connect them with needed pandemic influenza information and resources.</li> <li>▪ Implement survivor assistance programs, in accordance with guidance from OPM, to provide families with guidance on benefits should an employee die.</li> <li>▪ Stockpile hygiene supplies, anti-viral medicines, and other medical necessities to ensure the health and wellness of healthy essential personnel and implement plans for distributing such supplies, in accordance with HHS and CDC guidance.</li> <li>▪ Medically screen and clear essential personnel when appropriate, and in accordance with HHS and CDC guidance.</li> </ul>

<b>DOE COOP Elements</b>	<b>COOP Regular Implementation Guidance</b>	<b>Pandemic Influenza Response Planning Considerations</b>
<b>Interoperable Communications</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Define Interoperable Communications availability at Alternate Operating Facilities.</li> <li>▪ Location of communication equipment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Systems that facilitate communication in the absence of person-to-person contact can be used to minimize workplace risk for essential employees and can be used to restrict workplace entry of people with influenza symptoms.</li> <li>▪ Planning should carefully consider the use of laptops, high-speed telecommunications links, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), and other systems that enable employees to perform essential functions while teleworking. This includes the identification, availability, redundancy, and testing of critical communications systems that support connectivity to internal Program/Staff Offices, external partners, critical customers, and other key stakeholders.</li> <li>▪ Test and exercise telework impact on internal networks as well as impact of government-wide mandated telework.</li> <li>▪ Create backup plans to use if communications infrastructure fails as a result of surge in demand.</li> </ul>

<b>DOE COOP Elements</b>	<b>COOP Regular Implementation Guidance</b>	<b>Pandemic Influenza Response Planning Considerations</b>
<b>Alternate Operating Facilities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Define both local and remote Alternate Operating Facilities.</li> <li>▪ Define office space requirements at Alternate Operating Facility.</li> <li>▪ Define lodging and food requirement for remote relocation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Because a pandemic influenza may present essentially simultaneous risk everywhere alternate operating facilities may not be viable, implementation planning for pandemic influenza will involve staff relocation/co-location such as “social distancing” in the workplace through telecommuting or other means.</li> <li>▪ Determine which Mission Essential Functions can be conducted from a remote location (e.g., home) and those that need to be performed at a designated facility.</li> <li>▪ For facilities that remain open, reliable logistical support, services, and infrastructure systems will need to be considered, including <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Prioritization/determination of accessible facilities/buildings (as alternative to relocating to remote facility)</li> <li>- Necessary support staff</li> <li>- Social distancing policies</li> <li>- Medical screening of employees</li> <li>- Health/medical units</li> <li>- Sanitation</li> <li>- Essential services and</li> <li>- Food/water.</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Impact local quarantines may have on open/accessible facilities and operating plans.</li> </ul>
<b>Devolution of Control and Direction</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Define Devolution Site</li> <li>▪ Devolution Procedures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Take into account how Field Elements will conduct Mission Essential Functions if pandemic influenza renders leadership and essential staff incapable or unavailable to execute those functions. Full or partial devolution of Mission Essential Functions may be necessary to ensure continuation.</li> <li>▪ Plan to rotate operations between regional offices, as the pandemic moves may not spread in a wave pattern throughout the United States.</li> <li>▪ Develop detailed guidance for devolution, including <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mission Essential Functions</li> <li>- Supporting tasks</li> <li>- Points of contacts</li> <li>- Resources and phone numbers.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<b>DOE COOP Elements</b>	<b>COOP Regular Implementation Guidance</b>	<b>Pandemic Influenza Response Planning Considerations</b>
<b>Reconstitution</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Develop reconstitution plan</li> <li>▪ Address personnel, technical, logistical, and security issues.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A primary challenge for Program/Staff Offices, after a pandemic influenza, will be the replacement of deceased personnel or others unable to work.</li> <li>▪ Develop casualty replacement system to ensure accurate identification of vacant slots and prioritization of hiring effort.</li> <li>▪ Develop plans and procedures in accordance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration guidance to ensure the facilities/buildings are safe for employees.</li> <li>▪ Utilize existing Employee Assistance Programs as the points of contact for counseling and other mental health and social services resources.</li> </ul>
<b>Testing, Training, and Exercising</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ensure every employee is involved.</li> <li>▪ Verify contact information, including home phone numbers, is accurate.</li> <li>▪ Verify that Alternate Operating Facilities remain available and viable for use by office personnel.</li> <li>▪ Verify that phones at Alternate Operating Facilities are available and phone lists are accurate.</li> <li>▪ Verify that employees can log on to computers and access essential information, and that vital records are available and up-to-date at Alternate Operating Facilities.</li> <li>▪ Verify that essential equipment is available and operable at Alternate Operating Facilities.</li> <li>▪ Verify that Mission Essential Functions can be performed at the Alternate Operating Facilities.</li> <li>▪ Verify that employees that may be expected to work from home are able to do so.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Pandemic influenza implementation plans should test, train, and exercise sustainable social distancing techniques that reduce person-to-person interactions within the workplace.</li> <li>▪ Testing, training, and exercising should include social distancing techniques, including telework capabilities and impacts of a skeleton staff on facilities and Mission Essential Functions.</li> </ul>

## Annex G – Acronyms

AOF	Alternate Operating Facility
CEMC	Continuity Emergency Management Center (GTN Room <span style="background-color: red; color: black;">xxxx</span> )
CEMT	Continuity Emergency Management Team
CERG	Continuity Emergency Response Group
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CIO	Chief Information Officer
COG	Continuity of Government
COGCON	Continuity of Government Condition
COOP	Continuity of Operations
CRAR	Continuity Readiness Assurance Report
CST	Continuity Support Team
DOE	Department of Energy
EAP	Employee Assistance Program
ECG	Enduring Constitutional Government
EMT	Headquarters Emergency Management Team
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
ERAP	Emergency Readiness Assurance Plan
ESA	Essential Supporting Activities
FCD	Federal Continuity Directive
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FORS	DOE Forrestal Building
GETS	Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
GSA	General Services Administration
GTN	DOE Germantown Facility
HQ	Headquarters
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HSS	Health, Safety, and Security Office
IT	Information Technology
LPSO	Lead Program Secretarial Officer
MEF	Mission Essential Functions
NCR	National Capital Region
NEF	National Essential Functions
NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
OCIO	Office of the Chief Information Officer
OEP	Occupant Emergency Plan
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
P.L.	Public Law
PMEF	Primary Mission Essential Functions
SECON	Security Condition
TT&E	Testing, Training, and Exercises
U.S.C.	United States Code
WO	DOE Watch Office
WPS	Wireless Priority Service



## Annex H – Glossary

1. **Agencies**—Federal executive branch departments and independent organizations.
2. **Agency Head**—the highest-ranking official of the primary occupant agency or a successor or designee selected by the official.
3. **All-hazard Risk Assessment**—a risk assessment performed on sites/facilities that are being considered as alternate operating facilities. The assessment analyzes the risks and vulnerability of the building to both natural and manmade disasters that could disrupt operations. Assessments performed for other program requirements (safety and security) can be utilized.
4. **Alternate Operating Facility (AOF)**—a location other than the primary facility used to carry out Mission Essential Functions (MEFs), Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs), or Essential Supporting Activities (ESAs) in a continuity situation. Also referred to as Continuity Facility.
5. **AOF Continuity Reception Team**—this team is responsible for assisting the relocating CERG members, get settled in and working at the AOF during a Continuity event. This team is part of the Continuity Management Response Team.
6. **Business Recovery Plan**—also known as a Business Continuity Plan. Used to prepare an organization for future incidents that could jeopardize the organization's core mission and its long term health, e.g., building fires, earthquakes, or pandemic illnesses.
7. **Catastrophic Emergency**—any incident, regardless of location, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the U.S. population, infrastructure, environment, economy, or Government functions.
8. **Continuity Capability**—the ability of an organization to continue performance of Essential Function utilizing Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government programs and integrated day-to-day operations with a primary goal of ensuring the preservation of our form of government under the Constitution and the continuing performance of National Essential Functions (NEFs) under all conditions.
9. **Continuity Coordinator**—departmental representative at the Assistant Secretary or equivalent level appointed by the Deputy Secretary of Energy to represent the Department.
10. **Continuity Emergency Management Center (CEMC)**—location used by the Continuity Emergency Management Team (CEMT) to perform functions during a Continuity event. In the Germantown facility, this is Room **XXXX**.
11. **Continuity Emergency Management Team (CEMT)**—component of the Continuity Emergency Response Group (CERG) responsible for coordination of information and

actions in a continuity event; the primary information hub and source for situational updates to DOE decision makers.

12. **Continuity Emergency Response Group (CERG)**—individuals that provide leadership, coordinate emergency response activities, perform MEFs and ESAs, and provide logistics and other support. The CERG is divided into several teams.
13. **Continuity Emergency Response Group (CERG) Member**—a person assigned responsibility to report to an alternate site to perform MEFs, PMEFs, ESAs or other continuity related operations.
14. **Continuity Event**—an emergency caused by natural disasters, accidents, military or terrorist attacks, technological emergencies, and pandemic/epidemic threats, which causes operations to relocate to an alternative site to ensure the continuation of essential functions.
15. **Continuity of Government (COG)**—a coordinated effort within each branch of government (e.g., the Federal government’s executive branch) to ensure that NEFs continue to be performed during a catastrophic emergency.
16. **Continuity of Operations (COOP)**—an effort within individual organizations (e.g., Federal executive branch departments and agencies) to ensure that MEFs continue to be performed during continuity events, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related emergencies.
17. **Continuity Programs**—a general term that includes all aspects of Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG), Continuity of Government (COG), and Continuity of Operations (COOP).
18. **Continuity Program Manager**—under the direction of agency head, manages the day-to-day continuity programs and represents their department or agency on the continuity community and working groups as appropriate. Reports to the Department Continuity Coordinator.
19. **Continuity Readiness Assurance Program**—a program developed and implemented by each DOE office to ensure that MEFs, PMEFs, and ESAs can be performed during a continuity event. The Continuity Readiness Assurance Program involves a systematic and structured approach of reviews, improvements, and documentation of continuity readiness. It is documented each year in the Continuity Readiness Assurance Report.
20. **Continuity Readiness Assurance Report**—documents the readiness of the office’s Continuity Readiness Assurance Program based on planning and preparedness activities and the results of the assessment, including evaluations and improvements. Can be included in the Emergency Readiness Assurance Report (ERAP).
21. **Continuity Support Team (CST)**—a component of the CERG staffed by the program office and staff office personnel who actually perform MEFs, PMEFs, and essential supporting activities (ESAs).

22. **COOP Activation**—the point at which the CERG is fully operational and accepts the transfer of essential functions from the primary operating facility.
23. **COOP Coordinator**—program office, staff office, or field element representative who represents and is the point-of-contact for their office or field element regarding COOP.
24. **COOP Implementation Plan**—a type of COOP plan that each DOE HQ Program and Staff Office develops to implement their COOP office program. COOP Implementation Plans work in concert with the DOE COOP Plan. The Implementation Plan provides the planning and direction to the specific office of what needs to be done in a continuity event.
25. **COOP Plan**—also known as the Continuity of Operations Plan, is a DOE/NNSA-wide plan that documents and describes the DOE Continuity Program, provides implementation processes and procedures for DOE Headquarters (HQ) in a continuity event and provides guidance to DOE Field Element on the development and implementation of their own COOP Programs.
26. **COOP Plan Activation**—the process of implementing a COOP Plan when a notification occurs of a change in the COOP COGCON Level to COOP COGCON Levels 2 or 1. Usually involves the movement of the CERG to AOFs.
27. **Delegation of Authority**—identification, by position, of the personnel with authority for making policy determinations and decisions at HQ, field levels, and all other organizational locations when primary personnel are unavailable. Generally, pre-determined delegations of authority will take effect when normal channels of direction are disrupted and terminate when these channels have resumed.
28. **Devolution**—the capability to transfer statutory authority and responsibility for essential functions from an Agency's primary operating staff and facilities to other employees and facilities and to sustain that operational capability for an extended period.
29. **Disaster Recovery Plan**—disaster recovery is the process of regaining access to the data, hardware, and software necessary to resume critical business operations after a natural or human-induced disaster.
30. **Drive-Away Kit**—a collection of materials prepared for an individual who expects to deploy to an alternate location during a continuity event. It contains items needed to minimally satisfy personal and professional needs during deployment.
31. **Emergency Operating Records**—vital records essential to the continued functioning or reconstitution of an organization during and after a continuity event. Included are emergency plans and directives, orders of succession, delegations of authority, staffing assignments, selected program records needed to continue the most critical agency operations (MEFs/PMEFs), and related policy or procedural records that assist Agency staff in conducting operations under emergency conditions and for resuming normal operations after a continuity event.

32. **Emergency Readiness Assurance Plan (ERAP)**—an annual report that each field element submits summarizing its emergency management program. It identifies the goals and accomplishments of the past fiscal year and the goals for the current fiscal year.
33. **Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG)**—a cooperative effort among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government, coordinated by the President, as a matter of comity with respect to the legislative and judicial branches and with proper respect for the constitutional separation of powers among the branches, to preserve the constitutional framework under which the Nation is governed and the capability of all three branches of Government to execute constitutional responsibilities and provide for orderly succession, appropriate transition of leadership, and interoperability and support of the NEFs during a catastrophic emergency.
34. **Epidemic**—a pronounced clustering of contagious disease cases within a short period of time; more generally, a contagious disease whose frequency of occurrence is in excess of the expected frequency in a population during a given time interval.
35. **Essential Functions**—critical activities performed by organizations after a disruption of normal activities. The categories are NEFs, MEFs, and PMEFs. The essential functions of particular DOE offices are those functions/activities that accomplish or support the Department's MEFs, PMEFs, and ESAs.
36. **Essential Resources**—those that support the Federal Government's ability to provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety and well being of the general populace, and sustain the industrial/economic base during a continuity event.
37. **Essential Supporting Activities (ESAs)**—those activities performed by an Agency or department so that the department's MEFs, PMEFs, or a NEF can be accomplished.
38. **Executive Agent**—a term used to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on behalf of the superior. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes.
39. **Exercises**—organized activity designed to test the ability to execute business continuity plans and evaluate individual or organizational performance against approved standards or objectives. Exercises can be announced or unannounced and are performed for the purpose of training and conditioning team members and validating continuity plans. Exercise results identify plan gaps and limitations and are used to improve and revise the continuity plans. Types include table top exercises, simulations, operational exercises, mock disasters, desktop exercises, and full rehearsals.
40. **Facility**—several structures or component units with a common or related purpose may constitute a single facility. A complex of dissimilar buildings, processes, and equipment may also be considered as a single facility if they are physically adjacent, under common management, and contribute to a common programmatic mission.

41. **Field Element**—operations offices, service centers, site offices, area offices, regional offices of federally staffed laboratories, and Power Marketing Administrations.
42. **Flexiplace**—when an employee carries out work duties at his/her residence or other location rather than the official duty station.
43. **Government Emergency Telecommunication Service (GETS)**—a telecommunication service that provides continuity responders a high probability of completion of their land line telephone calls in a continuity event.
44. **Go-Kit**—A collection of supplies prepared by, and for, an individual who expects to deploy to an AOF during an emergency. It includes the minimum items needed to satisfy basic personal and professional requirements during deployment. This term also applies to family preparedness ([www.ready.gov](http://www.ready.gov))
45. **Government Functions**—the collective functions of the heads of executive departments and agencies as defined by the Constitution, statute, regulation, presidential direction, or other legal authority, and the functions of the legislative and judicial branches.
46. **Interagency Agreement**—a written agreement entered into between agencies that require specific goods, services to be furnished, or tasks to be accomplished by one agency in support of the other.
47. **Interoperability**—
  - a. The ability of systems, personnel, or agencies to provide services to and accept services from other systems, personnel, or agencies and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.
  - b. The condition achieved among communications-electronic systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users.
48. **Interoperable Communications**—alternate communications capabilities that perform essential functions in conjunction with other agencies until normal operations can be resumed.
49. **Legal and Financial Records**—vital records essential to protect legal and financial rights of the Government and individuals directly affected by its activities, also known as rights and interests records. Samples include accounts receivable records, social security records, payroll records, retirement records, and insurance records.
50. **Mission Critical Data**—information essential to supporting the execution of an Agency or Department's MEFs and PMEFs.
51. **Mission-Critical Emergency Employees** – SC Employees who are deemed necessary to the operation of the Office of Science during an emergency situation and are designated as such by SC

52. **Mission Critical Systems**—equipment essential to supporting the execution of an Agency or Department's MEFs and PMEFS.
53. **Mission Essential Functions (MEFs)**—the limited set of Department and Agency-level Government functions that must be continued after a disruption of normal activities up to 30 days following a continuity event. MEFs provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety of the general public and sustain the industrial/economic base during disruption of normal operations.
54. **Multi-year Strategy and Program Management Plan**—a Departmental plan that describes a process that ensures the maintenance and continued viability of the COOP program.
55. **National Essential Functions (NEFs)**—a set of Government functions that are necessary to lead and sustain the country during a catastrophic emergency and must be supported through COOP and COG capabilities.
56. **Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP)**—procedures developed to protect life and property in a specific federally-occupied space under stipulated emergency conditions.
57. **Orders of Succession**—provisions for the assigning of senior Agency officials' responsibilities during an emergency in the event that any of those officials are unavailable to execute their legal duties.
58. **Pandemic**—a worldwide epidemic when a new or novel strain of influenza disease emerges in which humans have little or no immunity, and develops the ability to infect and be passed between humans.
59. **Primary Operating Facility**—the site of normal, day-to-day operations; the location where an employee usually goes to work.
60. **Primary Mission Essential Functions** – those department and agency MEFs which must be performed in order to support the performance of NEFs before, during, and in the aftermath of a continuity event. PMEFS need to be continuous or resumed within 12 hours after an event and maintained for up to 30 days or until normal operations can be resumed.
61. **Primary Mission Essential Functions**—those Government functions that must be performed to support or implement the performance of NEFs before, during, and in the aftermath of a continuity event.
62. **Reconstitution**—the process by which surviving and/or replacement Agency personnel resume normal operations from the original or replacement primary operating facility.
63. **Relocation**—The process of moving personnel, records, equipment, and performance of Essential Functions and ESAs to an AOF during a Continuity event.
64. **Risk Analysis**—identification and assessment of hazards effects and countermeasures.

65. **Site**—the area over which DOE has access control authority.
66. **Telecommuting Locations**—those locations with computers and telephones that enable employees to work at locations other than their main offices.
67. **Telework**—when an employee carries out work duties at his/her residence or other location rather than the official duty station.
68. **Test**—a pass/fail evaluation of infrastructure (e.g., computers, cabling, devices, hardware and physical plant infrastructure (e.g., building systems, generators, utilities)) to demonstrate the anticipated operation of the components and system. Tests are often performed as part of normal operations and maintenance. Tests are often included within exercises (see Exercise).
69. **Training, Testing, and Exercises (TT&E)**—measures to ensure that a Department/Agency's COOP program is capable of supporting the continued execution of its MEFs, PMEFS, and ESAs throughout the duration of a COOP situation.
70. **Virtual Offices**—a location or environment where an employee performs work with portable information technology and communication packages.
71. **Vital Databases**—information systems needed to support MEFs, PMEFS, and ESAs during a COOP situation.
72. **Vital Records**—the emergency operating records and legal and financial rights records required to accomplish MEFs, PMEFS, and ESAs during and after a continuity event, or as part of the recovery from a disaster.
73. **Watch Office**—The DOE Watch Office is the Department's focal point for all external communications between the Department and outside agencies.